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Abstract
Market deregulation and growing membership heterogeneity a®ect the relationship between
cooperatives and their members. We study, using a quantitative model, how French marketing
cooperatives can develop for their members a set of contracts adapted to their environment.
These contracts should maintain global membership commitment.
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European market deregulation is destabilizing the economic environment of French agricul-
tural cooperatives, which in turn a®ects the relationship between agricultural cooperatives and
their members. Furthermore, members are more and more heterogeneous (e.g., di®erences in
farm size, farm technologies and practices, and cultural background). They also have more
individualistic goals, which increases di±culties for collective actions and thus, challenges co-
operative principles. This heterogeneity questions the egalitarian treatment principle. With
respect to this constraint, Fulton (1999) explains how member commitment to their cooperative
is important to its stability. He highlights that cooperative ideology, that was the principal
source of member commitment, is falling apart. As a result, cooperatives must ¯nd another
feature that can reinforce member commitment. Otherwise, they will only attract ine±cient
producers (Karantinis and Zago 2001).
To cope with member heterogeneity and disengagement, cooperatives have several strategies.
The ¯rst one is to o®er di®erential treatments according to volume (Vercammen, Fulton, and
Hyde 1996) and therefore, cooperatives can keep attracting large-scale producers. The second
strategy is to develop value-added products in order to di®erentiate themselves from other ¯rms.
It can be illustrated by the development of New Generation Cooperatives. They are involved
in niche markets with value-added products. They also have key features that disrupt the
traditional idea of cooperation : they have closed membership and they link producer capital to
its delivery rights (Harris, Stefanson, and Fulton 1996). A third alternative is to innovate and
develop marketing programs and services in order to meet individual producer needs (Reynolds
1997). This strategy exists in the U.S. to manage price risk. To cope with price volatility,
cooperatives o®er risk management strategies to their members. By doing so, they allow farmers
to secure a fraction of their revenue (Harrison, Bobst, Benson, and Meyer 1996, Cropp 1997,
1Kinser and Cropp 1998, Duvaleix 2000)
In France, the relationship between cooperatives and their members, later on referred as the
cooperative contract, is unique. The basic price that members receive for their raw product
is the same for all of them. The only variation depends on the composition of raw products.
However, because of both the evolution of the economic environment and new expectations from
members, the strict application of this rule is questioned.
This paper aims at examining the economic consequences of di®erentiating members treat-
ments on the current cooperative contract. In order to meet this objective, we develop a model
of a representative cooperative that takes into account several types of di®erentiated contracts.
This study also aims at meeting professional's information needs about how French dairy coop-
erative can o®er individualized contracts to cope with the evolution of the European economic
environment.
1 Model
French agricultural cooperatives do not take much degree of freedom in the relationship with
their members even if the juridical statute is less binding than they believe (Duvaleix, Cordier,
and Hovelaque 2003). Moreover, the economic environment does not let dairy cooperatives much
°exibility on de¯ning the terms of their member contracts. The European quota system sets up
the upper limit of milk quantity members deliver to the cooperative. And, in the dairy sector,
producers, cooperatives and investor-owned ¯rms agree to determine the national variations of
milk prices. Furthermore, European Union commits itself to gradually reduce the intervention
price on dairy commodities such as butter and nonfat dry milk. This commitment, in a world
context of opening markets, entails a downward trend on milk price and strengthen industrial
confrontation in a sector in needs of outlets. Therefore, dairy cooperative should be creative in
their relationships with agricultural producers in order to stay competitive, be e±cient and keep
2members commitment. They should o®er contracts, speci¯c to the need of an heterogeneous
group of members, and allow these contracts to vary on quantity, quality and pricing. We
call them individualized contracts. Furthermore, these contracts should preserve cooperative
principles. Rules should be known from and be applied to all members.
To meet the heterogeneous expectations of members and to cope with economic constraints,
cooperative managers should o®er individualized contracts while preserving fairness among mem-
bers. Is it conceivable and economically sustainable in a cooperative organization?
1.1 Description of the model
Figure 1 illustrates the model of a representative dairy cooperative. To quote Tsay et al.
(1999) \supply chain is two or more parties linked by a °ow of goods, information and funds".
Using this de¯nition, the relationship between an agricultural cooperative and its members can
be regarded as a supply chain. Using supply chain models allow us to focus on operational
information, and thus to explicit the modeling of material, information and ¯nancial °ows in
a marketing cooperative and thus, closely linked members to their cooperative's downstream
markets. Three elements are parts of this supply chain. The ¯rst one de¯nes the objective
function of a cooperative. The second element deals with the relationships between a cooperative
and its downstream markets. The last element handles the relationships between a cooperative
and its members, conceptualized as individualized contracts which take into account members'
preferences. We also use simulation techniques to incorporate uncertainty to the model. The
model is applied to dairy cooperatives from Western France.
3Figure 1: Cooperative Model
1.1.1 The objective function of a cooperative
In our model, the cooperative looks for maximizing the \shared value" (SV ) de¯ned by De-
shayes (1988). It consists of the revenue from the sales of ¯nal products to which we subtract
production (Cp) and management (Cm) costs like any other ¯rms. We exclude the purchas-
ing cost of milk from all other costs. As cooperative owners, members get returns from their
investment in the cooperative through milk pricing. The cooperative also keeps a part of the
generated results, the reserves (R), in order to be able to grow. The \shared value" can be
written as follows.
SV = S ¡ Cp ¡ Cm ¡ R
1.1.2 The relationship between a cooperative and its downstream markets
To model the relationships between an agricultural cooperative and its downstream markets,
we extend the Newsboy model, well-known inventory model (Khouja 1999). The optimization
program is developed on a one-setting period using Mathematica.
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Figure 2: Schematic of the cooperative °ows
Figures 2 illustrates the cooperative °ows. At the beginning of the period, members deliver
an agricultural product to their cooperative which produces di®erentiated products and basic
products. Di®erentiated products are value-added products because of either the processing
technology or the marketing strategy (e.g. products under national brands). Basic products are
low value-added products and they have standard characteristics.
The cooperative must accept all the quantity of raw milk delivered. We consider two levels of raw
milk quality: standard milk (M) and speci¯c milk (M), this level of quality requires a speci¯c
system of production as for example producing organic milk. Using speci¯c milk, the cooperative
decides to produce the optimal quantity of the di®erentiated Product 1 (q1), this product is a
fromage µ a p^ ate press¶ ee cuite. It also produces the optimal quantity of the di®erentiated Product
2 (q2), a fromage frais, using standard raw milk. These two ¯nal products are two types of
cheese. The cooperatives produces two types of basic products (qi) using the quantity of raw
milk left.
The cooperative faces demand from downstream markets. At the end of the period, demand is
revealed. The cooperative can then face two situations. In the ¯rst situation, it produced too
5many di®erentiated products. The excess production is sold on the market of basic products. In
the second one, it fails to provide enough products, unmet demand is lost. The cooperative faces
penalty costs. The demand of di®erentiated products (»di) and that of basic products (»bi) are
assumed stochastic. We assume the product demands are uniformally distributed in an interval
[min, max]. The cooperative sells its di®erentiated products at price (pdi) and its basic products
at price (pbi). The cooperative produces its di®erentiated products at a constant marginal cost
(cdi) and its basic products at a constant marginal costs (cbi).








»di f(d»di) d»di (1)
+ (pbi ¡ cdi)
Z qi
mindi
(qi ¡ »di)f(»di) d»di (2)
¡ (pdi ¡ cdi)
Z maxdi
qi
(»di ¡ q)f(»di) d»di (3)
¡ (pdi ¡ pbi)
Z qi
mindi
(qi ¡ »di)f(»di) d»di (4)
+ (pbi ¡ cbi)
Z maxbi
minbi
»bi f(d»bi) d»bi (5)



















(qi ¡ »di)f(»di) ¡ »bi
#
f(»bi) d»bi (7)
+ (pbpi ¡ cbpi)qbpi ) ¡ Cm ¡ R (8)
The cooperative \shared value" can be described by eight elements. The ¯rst one (1) is the
pro¯t generated from selling the di®erentiated products, it is equal to the margin multiplied by
the expected demand. The second element (2) is the pro¯t generated from selling the excess
production of the di®erentiated products on the basic market. The margin is then the di®erence
between the price of the basic products and the cost of producing the di®erentiated products.
The third part (3) deals with unmet demand. The cooperative faces penalty cost from not
6providing enough di®erentiated products. The penalty cost is the di®erence between the cost
of producing the di®erentiated products and their price. The fourth element (4) is the losses
generated by the excess stock sold in the basic market. Part (5) represents the pro¯ts generated
from selling the basic products. In Part (6), we deal with unmet demand for the basic products.
The penalty cost is equal to the di®erence between the cost of producing the basic products
and their price. The expected quantity of unmet demand is the revealed demand to which we
subtract the quantity of the basic products and the expected stock of the di®erentiated products.
In Part (7), we take into account the potential losses from producing too many basic products.
Its cost is equal to the cost of producing the basic products minus the salvage price. Lastly
(8), we include the pro¯ts generated by selling the by-products and we deduce the management
costs and the reserves.
The cooperative objective function can be generalized to any agricultural marketing cooper-
ative. Constraints are applied to the dairy case.
Raw milk contains two components, fat content and protein content. Raw milk has ® kilograms
per liter of fat content and ¯ kilograms per liter of protein content. The ¯nal product i has ®i
kilograms per liter of fat content and ¯i kilograms per liter of protein content. Constraints are
written as follows:
Mu ¡ °1q1 = 0 (9)
¯Mu ¡ ¯1q1 ¡ Prot1 = 0 (10)
®Mu ¡ ®1q1 ¡ Fat1 = 0 (11)
Mu ¡ °2q2 = 0 (12)
¯Mu ¡ ¯2q2 ¡ Prot2 = 0 (13)
®Mu ¡ ®2q2 ¡ Fat2 = 0 (14)
7M ¡ Mu ¡ Mun = 0 (15)










¡ ®1q1 ¡ ®2q2 ¡ ®gFat3 = 0 (18)
q1;q2;q1;q2 ¸ 0 (19)
Constraint (9) and (12) tell us that the cooperative needs °i liters of milk to produce one
kilogram of Product i. Constraints (10), (13) and (17) check that the proteins that are contained
in raw milk are either in the ¯nal products or in the by-products (Prot1, Prot2 and Prot3).
Constraints (12), (14) and (18) check that the fat, contained in raw milk, is either in the ¯nal
products or in the by-products (Fat1, Fat2 and Fat3). Constraints (15) and (16) check that
the cooperative does not use more milk than its members deliver.
1.1.3 The relationship between a cooperative and its members
Initially, all members get the same contract from the cooperative. We call it the basic
contract. Then, to satisfy the members' expectations, individualized contracts are o®ered. We
study more speci¯cally two terms of contracts, quality and pricing.
The basic contract represents the current situation between agricultural producers and their
cooperative. This contract is used in the results as the reference contract. Membership is
open. The cooperative does not set up any volume constraint on the agricultural product
delivered by members. However, in the European dairy sector, producers are bound by the
quota system. They can only deliver a quantity of milk that does not exceed their individual
quota. Standard quality is required. Because of the cooperative nature, members depends on the
cooperative's ability to generate gains. Indeed, price is known at the end of the exercise. Under
this contract, producers receive what we call the \average price" which is equal to the \shared
value" divided by the quantity of milk delivered. The average price is written as AP = SV=M.
8If we assume the cooperative o®ers individualized contracts then the average price should take
into account the total value of the individualized contracts. The average price is then de¯ned as
AP = (SV ¡PcMc)=Mbc where Pc is the price of milk under the individualized contract, Mc is
the milk quantity under contract and Mbc is the milk quantity under the basic contract, which
means Mbc is the milk quantity left.
The cooperative determines all contract prices. Producers act as followers. They can only
decide whether they take or leave the contract. They act as Stackelberg leaders.
1. The quality contracts
Raw milk is produced under a speci¯c system of production (e.g. organic milk). In
our model, the cooperative can set up the maximum bound of milk quantity under this
contract. The price is equal to the average price plus a premium. The quality premium is
calculated as a fraction of the margin generated by di®erentiated products.
2. The price risk management contracts
The price risk management contracts are already o®ered in the U.S. (Ling and Liebrand
1996). In our model, the cooperative o®ers several pricing possibilities, which present
di®erent levels of risks, not only for producers but also for the cooperative. As under
quality contracts, the cooperative can limit the milk volume under contract. Within the
price risk management contracts we can imagine, we study the four following contracts: the
spot price contract, the annual forward contract, the forward contract and the minimum
price contract.
² The spot price contract
Under this contract, producers choose to receive the spot price at each delivery.
They agree to manage themselves the price variation, upward or downward. The
cooperative establishes this price using the cash market price as a reference.
9² The annual forward contract
By choosing this contract, producers look for stabilizing their revenue. They receive
the same price for the whole year.
² The forward contract
It allows producers to get a known price for a future period. We assume that forward
price is given every trimester. The producers can thus take four decisions a year and
they can have an opportunistic behavior depending on their beliefs on the market
evolution.
² The minimum price contract
The cooperative o®ers options to their members. It guarantees that the raw milk
price producers receive cannot fall under a safe net price. Moreover, they can take
advantage of upward price moves on the cash market and at the same time they limit
their potential losses.
1.2 Implementation of data into the model
The model parameters were set up with the help of professionals from dairy cooperatives.
1.2.1 The cooperative
Producers deliver two levels of raw milk quality. Standard quality of raw milk stands for
10 millions of liters per month. Speci¯c quality of raw milk represents 7.5 millions of liters per
month. Raw milk contains 40 grams per liter of fat content and 32 grams per liter of protein
content. The processing costs of the two products and their by-products are given in Table 1.
The cooperative also faces ¯xed management costs. They are set up as a fraction of the total
margin, Cm = ½ (Md + Mb + Mbp) with ½ = 0:1.
The cooperative reserves are retained to ¯nance future investments. We assume they are de-
pendent on the position of the cooperative on its downstream markets. They are set up as a
10Costs Price ¹ ¾ ® ¯ °
q1 0:9C 5C 0:3kg 0:3kg 11L
q2 0:7C 2:25C 0:07kg 0:075kg 2:6L
q1 0:6C 4C 0% 2:7% 0:3kg 0:3kg 11L
q2 0:7C 1:5C 0% 2:5% 0:07kg 0:075kg 2:6L
qbp1 0:2C 3C ¡0:05% 5:5% 0:82kg
qbp2 0:1C 2:2C ¡0:05% 30% 0:355kg
Table 1: Data for the model parameters
percentage of sales generated by di®erentiated products, R = Á CAd with Á = 0:15.
1.2.2 The cooperative downstream markets
Downstream markets are characterized by the parameters on demands and prices. In our
model, the demand of Product 1 in thousands kg per month falls into the interval [365, 500].
The demand of Product 2 in thousands kg per month falls into the interval [1 450, 2 000]. The
values of the other parameters are given in Table 1.
1.2.3 The individualized contracts
In our study, we assume that the milk quantity under the quality contract is set up to 50% of
the total quantity of speci¯c milk. The quality premium (pqc) is a fraction µ of the di®erentiated
product margin, µ = 2% or 20%. The volume of milk under the pricing contract represents
50% of the total quantity of standard milk. The contract pricing depends on the spot price
(c.f. Table2). To model the spot price, we take a geometric Brownian motion (Musiela and
Rutkowski 1997). We can write the spot price as follows:















Basic contract Variable R or R AP = (SV ¡ P cRc)=Rbc
Quality contract 0:5R R pqc = µMd=R
Spot price contract 0:5R R e Pt




Forward contract 0:5R R Pf;t = e Pt¡1




Table 2: Description of the studied contracts
where Wt » N(0;¢t), ¹ is a constant appreciation rate of the spot price, ¾ > 0 is a constant
volatility coe±cient. The spot price ( e Pt) allows us to introduce a higher volatility on the milk
price received by producers. And consequently, it allows us to examine the e®ects of market
deregulation. For the spot price, ¹ is equal to 0:02% and ¾ is equal to 13%. The annual forward
price (Paf) is determined as the average of the monthly spot price of the previous year. The
forward price (Pf;t) is set up every trimester using naive anticipation. For example, the forward
price observed by producers in January (beginning of trimester 1) for trimester 2 (period from
April to June) is the January spot price. The minimum price (Pm;t) is calculated as a fraction
¸ of the annual price, ¸ = 0:95. The study horizon length is six years. The ¯rst year allows us
to initialize the model. The ¯ve other years provide the results.
2 Results
In order to examine the economics consequences of di®erentiating producer treatments on
the basic cooperative contract, we mainly study the distributions of the average price when the
cooperative o®ers individualized contracts.
12We assume that the cooperative position on downstream markets has an e®ect on the basic
cooperative contract. In order to discuss this hypothesis, we study two scenarii. In the ¯rst
scenario Scen1, the cooperative produces 75% of di®erentiated products and 25% of basic prod-
ucts. In the second one Scen2, it produces 25% of di®erentiated products and 75% of basic
products.
We examine the e®ects of the spot price contract, the annual forward contract, the forward
contract, the minimum price contract and the quality contract on the average price in both
scenarii. To interpret the results, we ¯rstly use a mean comparison test and, we secondly
use the concept of volatility. The mean comparison test informs us whether the average price
signi¯cantly changes between two cases. The concept of volatility, often used in ¯nance, allows
us to estimate the risk associated to individualized contracts. Hull (2000) de¯nes the volatility
as ¾¤ = s p


















where Si represents the price
in Period i, n + 1 the number of observations and ¿ the length of time interval in years. In our
model, n + 1 = 500 and ¿ = 1=12.
In Figure 3, we compare the average price in Scenario 1 (AP Basic Scen1) with the average
price in Scenario 2 (AP Basic Scen2) when no individualized contract is o®ered. The thick curve
represents the di®erence between the mean of the average price in Scenario 1 and that of the
average price in Scenario 2. The two other curves represent the 95% con¯dence interval when
we realize a mean comparison test. The horizon length is ¯ve years.
13Figure 3: Di®erence in the average price means between the two scenarii
From this ¯gure, we show a ¯rst result.
Result 1: A cooperative that increases its proportion of di®erentiated products increases the
average price received by its members. And inversely, a cooperative that increases its proportion
of basic products reduces the average price received by its members.
The di®erence (about 25Cper 1000 liters) between the two means of the average price is
above the 95% con¯dence interval (at the beginning of study the horizon, [¡2;2]; at the end of
the horizon study, [¡4:5;4:5]1). The 95% con¯dence interval increases because of the increase
in standard deviation. Uncertainty is higher when time increases. This ¯rst results remind
us that the price received by agricultural producers depends on the cooperative position on
its downstream markets. Today, milk producers should worry about the value created in the
processing of their raw milk because their sales increase accordingly. Agricultural producers,
through their cooperative, can play a role in the agrofood system in order to capture some value.
We now examine the e®ects of individualized contracts on the average price.
Result 2: In Scenario 1, members receive a higher average price when their cooperative
1The unit is Cper 1000 liters
14o®ers price risk management contract. Whereas in Scenario 2, members does not signi¯cantly
receive a higher average price when their cooperative o®ers price risk management contracts.
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate this result. The di®erence between the mean of the average price
when no price risk management contract is o®ered and the mean of the average price when the
cooperative o®ers them is below the 95% con¯dence interval in Scenario 1. For exemple when a
cooperative in Scenario 1 o®ers a spot price contract, this di®erence is approximately equal to
-15Cper 1000 liters whereas the 95% con¯dence interval falls between [¡2;2] at the beginning
of the horizon study and between [¡5;5] at the end of it. In Scenario 2, the di®erence between
the two means of the average price falls within the 95% con¯dence interval from Year 3 to the
end of the study horizon. We ¯nd similar results for the annual forward contract, the forward
contract and the minimum price contract.
Figure 4: Di®erence between the average price mean of the basic contract and that of the spot
price contract in Scenario 1
This result implies that the price risk management contracts satisfy all members, at least
when we observe the change in mean. The members who only take the basic contracts receive
a higher average price in Scenario 1 and does not signi¯cantly notice any change in Scenario 2.
15Moreover, price risk management contracts allows producers to decide the revenue they would
like to reach. The following result brings some limit to these contracts.
Figure 5: Di®erence between the average price mean of the basic contract and that of the spot
price contract in Scenario 2
Result 3: In both scenarii, the introduction of price risk management contracts increases
the volatility of the average price.
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate this result. In scenario 1, the volatility of the average price when a
cooperative only o®ers the basic contract is about 4.5%. When it o®ers price risk management
contracts, the volatility of the average price is around 6%. In Scenario 2, the volatility of
the average price goes from 5.5% to about 8%. The price risk management contracts allow
producers to choose the price they would like to get for their raw material. This choice implies
consequences on their cooperative and producers who only choose the basic contract. It induces a
higher volatility of the average price and thus, more risks for the cooperative and the producers
who only choose to take the basic contract. Consequently, the cooperative cannot o®er such
contracts without developing strategies in order to avoid potential con°icts among members.
Result 4: In Scenario 1, the average price, when the quality contract is introduced, is more
16XXXXXXXXXXX Contracts
Year
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5
AP Basic 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.5
AP Quality (premium 2%) 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.6
AP Quality (premium 20%) 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.8
AP Spot price 6.6 6.6 6.9 7.0 6.9
AP Annual forward 5.7 5.7 6.0 6.0 6.1
AP Forward 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
AP Minimum price 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.1
Table 3: Average price (AP) volatility in Scenario 1
sensitive to the level of the quality premium. When the quality premium coe±cient is 20%, the
average price is signi¯cantly lower whereas when the quality premium coe±cient is 2%, it is not
signi¯cant. In Scenario 2, the change in mean is not signi¯cant.
In Scenario 1, the di®erence in mean is about 2Cper 1000 liters when the quality premium
coe±cient is 2%, the 95% con¯dence interval falls between [¡1:75;1:75] wherease when the
quality premium coe±cient is 20%, the di®erence in mean is about 20Cper 1000 liters and the
95% con¯dence interval falls between [¡1:75;1:75]. The change in mean is not signi¯cant with
a quality premium coe±cient of 2% whereas it is when the quality premium coe±cient is 20%.
In Scenario 2, the di®erence in mean is about 1Cper 1000 liters when the quality premium
coe±cient is 2%, the 95% con¯dence interval falls between [¡2:2;2:2] whereas when the quality
premium coe±cient is 20%, the di®erence in mean is about 7Cper 1000 liters and the 95%
con¯dence interval falls between [¡2:2;2:2] at the beginning of the study horizon. At the end of
the horizon, the di®erence in mean is about 6.2Cper 1000 liters and the 95% con¯dence interval
falls between [¡5:2;5:2] when the quality premium coe±cient is 20%. Consequently, at the end
17of the study horizon, we cannot conclude about a sgni¯cant change in mean of the Scenario 2
average price when the quality contract is introduced.
XXXXXXXXXXX Contracts
Year
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5
AP Basic 5.4 5.3 5.6 5.5 5.5
AP Quality (premium 2%) 5.4 5.3 5.6 5.5 5.5
AP Quality (premium 20%) 5.5 5.5 5.7 5.7 5.7
AP Spot price 8.1 8.1 8.6 8.6 8.5
AP Annual forward 7.3 7.3 7.7 7.6 7.6
AP Forward 7.7 7.6 7.7 7.6 7.6
AP Minimum price 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.6 7.5
Table 4: Average price (AP) volatility in Scenario 2
Surprisingly, the quality contract may appear more acceptable for all members in Scenario
2 than in Scenario 1. When the cooperative produces more di®erentiated products, the level of
the quality premium is an important decision factor in order to avoid potential con°icts among
producers. Indeed, the members who only take the basic contract get a lower average price
when quality contracts are o®ered and the quality premium is 20%. However, the cooperative
may justify the di®erence in the mean of the average price by rewarding the members who make
e®orts to produce raw milk with a better quality level.
Result 5: In both scenarii, the volatility of the average price does not change much when
the quality contract is introduced.
In Tables 4 and 5, we notice that the volatility of the average price when a cooperative o®ers
the quality contract is about 4.5% with a quality premimum coe±cient of 2% and 4.8% with
a quality premium coe±cient of 20% in Scenario 1. In the basic contract, the volatility of the
average price is about 4.5%. In Scenario 2, it is respectively equal to 5.5% and 5.6% when the
18quality premimum coe±cient is 2% and 20%. In the basic contract, the volatility is about 5.5%.
Consequently, the quality contracts do not introduce more risks for the cooperative.
Conclusion
In France, o®ering individualized contracts in agricultural cooperatives is an open debate.
They can deeply modify the relationship between a cooperative and its members. These contracts
allow members not to receive the same price and as a result, they allow them to make choice
about their system of production and about their way to manage risk.
Our model gives us results about the consequences of individualized contracts on the basic
cooperative contract. We study di®erent combinations of the terms of contracts such as volume,
quality and pricing. We show that price risk management contracts increase the risk faced by
members who take the basic contract. Whereas quality contracts change little as far as the level
of member risks under the basic contract is concerned.
In order to bring a useful information for French dairy cooperatives, to better de¯ne the
relationship between producers and cooperatives, we show the limitations of the model.
Firstly, we should develop more sophisticated decision rules as far as producers are concerned
in order to take into account the heterogeneity among producers' preferences.
Secondly, the cooperative should manage the risks induced by the price risk management con-
tracts it o®ers. It can manage those risks either by its own method or by transferring them to
¯nancial markets. The point is important to consider because of the destabilizing e®ect it can
produce among the members of a cooperative. The potential con°icts between the members
who choose the basic contract and those who have individualized contracts may question the
existence of the cooperative.
Lastly, we should thoroughly examine the implications of o®ering individualized contracts. They
may appear to rule out cooperative principles. They are o®ered in order to meet individual needs.
19Can they be justi¯ed in a collective organization? We state that solidarity between members
must be ful¯lled in order to o®er such contracts. We think that we should introduce in the study
questions about allocation of ¯xed costs associated to members. If the cooperative contract is
unique then all members bear ¯xed costs, which is the case in our de¯nition of the average price
contract. However, if some members accept contracts for their product, they will no longer bear
them and they will have opportunistic behavior. We would like to study thoroughly this concept
in a future research.
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